On August 4, 2026, the President of the Russian Federation signed Federal Constitutional Law No. 3‑FKZ of August 4, 2026, “On Amending Article 19 of the Federal Constitutional Law ‘On the Judicial System of the Russian Federation’ and Article 5 of the Federal Constitutional Law ‘On the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation’” (hereinafter – the “Law”)[1].
The Law gives the explanations of the Supreme Court, as well as the explanations of the Supreme Arbitration Court that have retained their force, a guiding character for judicial law enforcement. At the same time, this provision is not a fundamental novelty in Russian legislation, since previously the explanations of higher courts were in fact generally binding for courts and were taken into account when making decisions. The legislator has merely formally enshrined a legal approach that had already developed in practice.
As follows from the explanatory note of the Supreme Court to the draft law[2], the proposed amendments are intended to strengthen legal certainty and ensure uniformity of judicial practice. To this end, the Law additionally empowers the Plenum of the Supreme Court to hear reports from the chairmen of lower courts on issues of taking into account, in judicial practice, the legal positions contained in the resolutions of the Plenum and the Presidium of the Supreme Court, as well as in the resolutions of the Plenum of the Supreme Arbitration Court that have retained force.
Thus, it cannot be denied that with the adoption of the Law under consideration, the role of judicial interpretation in the Russian legal system will noticeably increase, since the novelty introduces an additional mechanism for monitoring the uniformity of judicial practice: the chairmen of lower courts will report to the Plenum of the Supreme Court on how the guiding legal positions are taken into account in the administration of justice. At the same time, a legitimate question arises as to how such reporting is consistent with the principle of judicial independence. Will it be purely statistical and informational in nature, or will it eventually turn into an instrument of administrative control over judicial practice? This question remains open.
It should be noted that in addition to this Law, the Supreme Court submitted to the State Duma draft law No. 1264907‑8[3] (hereinafter – the “Draft Law”), which, among other things, elaborates on the content of such a ground for amending or reversing a judicial act as misinterpretation of the law.
Thus, under the misinterpretation of the law, the adoption of a judicial act without taking into account the legal positions contained in the resolutions of the Constitutional Court, the Plenum and the Presidium of the Supreme Court, as well as in the resolutions of the Plenum of the Supreme Arbitration Court that have retained force, will be understood.
Consequently, if the Draft Law is adopted, ignoring the positions of the higher courts will likely more often serve as a ground for reversing judicial acts, which also indicates the strengthening of the importance of judicial interpretation. It can be assumed that the Law and the Draft Law will work together: the former establishes the guiding status of the explanations of the higher courts, while the latter will provide a procedural tool for their mandatory application.
[2] Explanatory Note to the draft Federal Constitutional Law “On Amending Article 5 of the Federal Constitutional Law ‘On the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation’”
[2] Here and below, Draft Law No. 1264907‑8 “On Amending Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation and Repealing the Federal Law ‘On Arbitration Assessors of Arbitration Courts of the Constituent Entities of the Russian Federation’”